Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
Patent Interference No. 102,274
August 14, 1992
Final Hearing October 23, 1991
Absorbent Article Having Dual Cuffs
Patent granted to Michael I. Lawson, on September 22, 1987, Patent No. 4,695,278, filed October 11, 1985, Serial No. 06/786,926.
Application of Kenneth M. Enloe, Serial No. 07/310,106, filed February 13, 1989. Accorded benefit of Serial No. 06/627,164, filed July 02, 1984, now abandoned; Serial No. 06/786,891, filed October 11, 1985, now Patent No. 4,704,116, issued November 3, 1987; Serial No. 07/085,422, filed August 13, 1987, now Patent No. 4,846,823, issued July 11, 1989; Serial No. 07/242,460, filed September 09, 1988.
Richard C. Witte, Thomas H. O'Flaherty, Frederick H. Braun, John M. Pollaro, Thomas J. Slone, Leonard W. Lewis, Steven W. Miller, Jerome G. Lee, John C. Vassil, John F. Sweeney and Stanley Schwartz for Lawson. Oral argument by John C. Vassil
Gregory E. Croft, Jeremiah J. Duggan, Joseph P. Harps, William D. Herrick, Paul A. Leipold, William E. Maycock, H. Donald Nelson, James P. O'Shaughnessy, Donald L. Traut, Patrick C. Wilson, Paul Y. Yee, Henry L. Brinks, Raymond W. Green and Kenneth L. Cage for Enloe. Oral argument by Henry L. Brinks
Before Boler, Cohen and Martin
This interference involves a patent to Lawson, assigned to The Procter and Gamble Company, and an application of Enloe, assigned to Kimberly-Clark Corporation.
The count in issue reads as follows:
An integral disposable absorbent article comprising:
a liquid previous topsheet; a liquid impervious backsheet associated with said topsheet;
an absorbent core disposed between said topsheet and said backsheet;
an elastically contractible gasketing cuff disposed adjacent to an edge of the absorbent article;
a barrier cuff having a proximal edge and a distal edge, said barrier cuff disposed inboard of said gasketing cuff; and
spacing means associated with said barrier cuff for spacing said distal edge away from the top surface of said topsheet.
The claims of the parties which correspond to this count are:
Lawson: Claims 1, 2, 4 through 8, 10 through 12, 14 through 16, 19, 20, 22 through 24 and 26.
Enloe: Claims 68 through 104.
Both parties filed evidentiary records under 37 CFR 1.653, filed briefs under 37 CFR 1.656 and appeared through counsel for oral argument pursuant to 37 CFR 1.654 at final hearing.
The application that matured into the Lawson patent was copending with Enloe's three earliest benefit applications. Accordingly, the burden is on Lawson, the junior party, to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Morgan v. Hirsch, 728 F.2d 1449, 221 USPQ 193 (Fed.Cir.1984).
*2 The issues presented are:
1. Whether Enloe is entitled to the benefit of application Serial No. 06/627,164, filed July 02, 1984;
2. Whether Lawson is entitled to rely on his second and/or third amended preliminary statements; and
3. Whether Lawson's motion to correct the inventorship of his patent was properly denied.
Enloe was accorded the benefit of application Serial No. 07/627,164 on declaration of the interference. Lawson moved (Paper No. 34) under 37 CFR 1.633(g) to deny Enloe the benefit of said application. The motion was denied by the examiner-in-chief in the Decision on Preliminary Motions (Paper No. 56, pages 4 and 5). In the motion, Lawson argued that the '164 application does not support (1) "an inner flap attached to the bodyside liner" or (2) "inner flaps which are sufficiently elasticized to provide for an elastic tension during use." The examiner-in-chief pointed out that the limitations that Lawson said were not supported by the '164 application were not in the count and held that Lawson had failed to show that Enloe was not entitled to the benefit of the application for the limitations actually in the count. The examiner-in-chief further pointed out that Enloe was entitled to the benefit of the '164 application for a constructive reduction to practice provided that application disclosed an embodiment falling within the count citing Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d 856, 196 USPQ 600, 608 n. 16 (CCPA 1978).
Lawson has not argued in his brief at final hearing that there was any error in the decision of the examiner-in-chief with respect to the above motion. Instead, Lawson now argues that two limitations which were not mentioned in the above motion that are in the count are not supported by the '164 application. The limitations now being argued are (1) "spacing means associated with said barrier cuff for spacing said distal edge away from the top surface of said topsheet" and (2) "an elastically contractible gasketing cuff disposed adjacent to an edge of the absorbent article." (Lawson main brief, pages 80-82). However, since the matters now raised were not raised in the motion under 37 CFR 1.633(g), Lawson is not entitled to raise them at final hearing under 37 CFR 1.655(b).
In his reply brief (page 49), Lawson points out that he had argued that Enloe's earlier applications lacked support for "an elastically contractible cuff" in an opposition (Paper No. 23) to a motion by Enloe for benefit of, inter alia, the '164 application with respect to claims 89 through 104 which Enloe had moved to have designated as corresponding to the count. In deciding that motion, the examiner-in-chief said, in effect, that Enloe's motion was unnecessary since he had been accorded benefit the earlier applications for the count on declaration of the interference and merely designating claims 89 through 104 as corresponding to the count did not change any of the limitations of the count.
*3 Lawson further notes in the reply brief that he argued both limitations now under consideration in a contingent motion (Paper No. 36) for judgment under 37 CFR 1.633(a) alleging lack of support under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, for claims 89 through 104 in Enloe's involved application. We note that the examiner-in-chief also denied that contingent motion but Lawson has not requested to have that decision of the examiner-in-chief reviewed in his brief at final hearing.
Lawson's motion (Paper No. 34) under 37 CFR 1.633(g) did not mention the opposition or motion under 37 CFR 1.633(a) now relied upon by him. Thus, he cannot properly argue that the arguments presented in those papers were somehow incorporated by reference into the 37 CFR 1.633(g) motion. In our view, since the arguments now relied upon by Lawson were not raised in the motion that he has requested us to review, he is not entitled to have those arguments considered at final hearing under 37 CFR 1.655(b). Cf. Fujiie v. Verhagen, 13 USPQ2d 1986 (BPAI 1989) aff'd mem., 887 F.2d 1094, 13 USPQ2d 1415 (Fed.Cir.1989). Accordingly, the decision of the examiner-in-chief in denying Lawson's motion under 37 CFR 1.633(g) is sustained.
Lawson submitted an original preliminary statement and first, second and third motions to amend the preliminary statement together with amended preliminary statements. The original preliminary statement (Paper No. 33) says "[T]he inventor of the invention defined by the count is Michael I. Lawson." The original preliminary statement alleges the following dates:
(1) First drawing--January 23, 1985;
(2) First written description--March 8, 1985;
(3) First disclosure to another--January 23, 1985 to March 8, 1985;
(4) Invention first conceived by inventor--January 23, 1985;
(5) First actual reduction to practice--March 7, 1985; and
(6) Beginning of reasonable diligence toward a reduction to practice--no date alleged.
The First Amended Preliminary Statement (Paper No. 43) says "[T]he inventors of the invention defined by the count are Michael I. Lawson, John M. Blevins and Kenneth B. Buell." The First Amended Preliminary Statement alleges the following dates:
(1) First drawing--March 8, 1979;
(2) First written description--March 8, 1979;
(3) First disclosure to another by one of the inventors--March 8, 1979;
(4) First conception by one of the inventors--March 8, 1979;
(5) First actual reduction to practice by one of the inventors--"may have been as early as March 8, 1979."
(6) Beginning of reasonable diligence toward a reduction to practice--no date alleged.
*4 The First Amended Preliminary Statement, a motion (Paper No. 44) under 37 CFR 1.635 and 1.628 to amend and a motion (Paper No. 45) under 37 CFR 1.634 to correct the inventorship of the involved Lawson patent were filed prior to the opening of the original preliminary statement. The examiner-in-chief denied the motion to substitute to the First Amended Preliminary Statement for the original preliminary statement and the motion to correct inventorship (Paper No. 56, pages 6-7). The examiner-in-chief pointed out on page 2 of Paper No. 72 that Lawson's amended statement (First Amended Preliminary Statement) does not allege a date for the beginning of diligence and does not allege a definite date for a reduction to practice and, thus, if it were substituted for the original preliminary statement, Lawson (i.e., Lawson, Blevins and Buell) would be restricted to the October 11, 1985 filing date of the Lawson involved patent for his (their) date of invention. Lawson has not requested review of the decision by the examiner-in-chief denying entry of the First Amended Preliminary Statement.
The parties served their original preliminary statements and Lawson's First Amended Preliminary Statement on June 20, 1990 (Paper Nos. 58 and 63). Lawson's testimony-in-chief period started on July 8, 1990 (Paper No. 56, page 8). On July 27, 1990, Lawson filed a second motion (Paper No. 75) under 37 CFR 1.635 to correct the preliminary statement and a Second Amended Preliminary Statement (Paper No. 76). In Paper No. 95, the examiner-in-chief deferred the motion to final hearing.
The Second Amended Preliminary Statement says "[T]he invention defined by the count was made by Michael I. Lawson, John M. Blevins and Kenneth B. Buell." It alleges different dates of invention for each of the named inventors as follows:
Buell Blevins Lawson
(1) First drawing-- 3/8/79 none 1/23/85
(2) First written description-- 3/8/79 9/23/83 3/8/85
(3) First disclosure to another-- 3/8/79 none 3/5/85
(4) First conceived by inventor-- 3/8/79 9/23/83 1/23/85
(5) First actual reduction to practice-- 3/9/79 9/85 3/7/85
(6) Beginning of diligence-- 3/8/79 none none
Except for alleging a definite date for item (3), the dates alleged for Michael I. Lawson are the same as those alleged in the original preliminary statement. No dates had been previously alleged for Blevins. The dates attributed to Buell are the same as those set forth in the First Amended Preliminary Statement except that that statement did not set forth a definite date for the first actual reduction to practice or for the beginning of diligence and did not attribute the dates to any particular individual.
*5 Lawson no longer relies on Blevins as an inventor of the broad subject matter of the count but only as contributor to certain dependent claims in the patent (main brief, page 29). He now argues that Buell is a sole inventor of the subject matter in the count, alleging a date of conception on March 8, 1979 and actual reductions to practice on March 9, 1979 and February 18, 1982 (main brief, page 14). If Buell is not accorded a date of invention of March 9, 1979 or February 18, 1982, the junior party alternatively relies upon the work of Lawson for priority of the invention defined by the count (main brief, page 79). However, since we have held above that Enloe is entitled to the benefit of the '164 application filed July 02, 1984, the junior party cannot prevail on the basis of Lawson's 1985 dates for conception and reduction to practice.
In our view, the Second Amended Preliminary Statement is confusing and indefinite in stating that "[T]he inventors of the invention defined by the count are Michael I. Lawson, John M. Blevins and Kenneth B. Buell" (emphasis added) and then setting out separate dates for each named inventor for the inventive acts required to be alleged in a preliminary statement under 37 CFR 1.623. 37 CFR 1.622 provides that "[A] preliminary statement must identify the inventor who made the invention defined by each count and must state on behalf of the inventor the facts required by paragraph (a) of [37 CFR] 1.623, 1.624 and 1.625 as may be appropriate." 37 CFR 1.629 provides "[A] party shall be strictly held to any date alleged in the preliminary statement. Doubts as to (1) definiteness or sufficiency of any allegation in a preliminary statement or (2) compliance with formal requirements will be resolved against the party filing the statement by restricting the party to the earlier of its filing date or effective filing date or to the latest date of a period alleged in the preliminary statement as may be appropriate." Any doubt as to whether Lawson is alleging a joint or sole invention of the subject matter of the count shall be resolved against him. By naming Lawson, Blevins and Buell as the inventors of the invention defined by the count Lawson is deemed to have alleged a joint invention by those three inventors. By alleging a range of conception dates from March 8, 1979 to January 23, 1985, the junior party is restricted to the latest date of the period alleged, namely, January 23, 1985. Likewise, with respect to the other dates alleged, the junior party is restricted to the latest date alleged. Thus, for a reduction to practice, the junior party is restricted to March 7, 1985 as the earliest date which it is entitled to prove. Since we have held above that Enloe is entitled to a priority date of July 02, 1984, the junior party cannot prevail on the basis of dates alleged in the Second Amended Preliminary Statement. Accordingly, the motion (Paper No. 76) to correct the preliminary statement is dismissed as moot.
*6 Lawson's testimony period closed on September 16, 1990 (Paper Nos. 98 and 100), Enloe waived a testimony period in Paper No. 110 filed October 11, 1990, the examiner-in-chief set dates for the records and briefs on October 16, 1990 (Paper No. 112) and Lawson filed a third motion (Paper No. 127) and a Third Amended Preliminary Statement on October 25, 1990 again naming Lawson, Blevins and Buell as the inventors of the subject matter defined by the count, alleging the same dates alleged in the Second Amended Preliminary Statement and additionally alleging derivation by Enloe. For the reasons stated above with respect to the Second Amended Preliminary Statement, the junior party would be restricted to January 23, 1985 for its earliest date of conception based on the allegations set forth in the Third Amended Preliminary Statement. "There can be no derivation without prior conception on the part of the party alleging derivation." Davis v. Reddy, 620 F.2d 885, 205 USPQ 1065 (CCPA 1980). Since the junior party would not be able to prove a date of conception prior to January 23, 1985 based on the allegations in the Third Amended Preliminary Statement, it could not establish derivation by Enloe who has been held above to be entitled to a date of priority of July 02, 1984. Accordingly, the junior party's motion (Paper No. 127) to correct the preliminary statement is dismissed as moot.
Since Lawson is restricted by his preliminary statement to a date of priority after Enloe's effective filing date of July 02, 1984, Enloe is entitled to judgment as the first inventor of the subject matter in issue.
Lawson has not specifically requested review of the decision (Paper No. 56, page 3) by the examiner-in-chief denying his motion to add Blevins and Buell as joint inventors with Lawson or review of the decision of the board with respect to that decision on reconsideration (Paper No. 71); nevertheless, Lawson argues that Blevins and Buell should be added as named inventors on the Lawson involved patent (main brief, page 53). We agree with the position of Enloe that there is no evidence in the record of any contribution to the invention disclosed in the Lawson patent by either Blevins or Buell as required by 35 USC 116. The invention disclosed in the Lawson patent is based solely on work done by Lawson. The fact that Blevins and/or Buell are employees of Lawson's assignee and may have done research on articles similar to that disclosed by Lawson without his knowledge is insufficient, in our view, to name them joint inventors of the subject matter disclosed in the Lawson patent. Lawson testified that he did not receive any information from either Buell or Blevins with respect the invention disclosed in his involved patent (LR 467-468) [FN1] and both Buell (LR 243-244, 251-252, 257) and Blevins (LR 133-134) testified that they did not communicate any information about their work to Lawson prior to his filing date nor were they aware of anyone else who had done so. Miller, the patent attorney who prepared the Lawson patent application, testified that the information contained therein came from Lawson and that he was not aware of any related work by Buell or Blevins when he prepared the application (LR 546- 548). Thus, there is no merit to the contention by present counsel for Lawson that Buell and Blevins should be named as joint inventors with Lawson.
The Evidence Filed by Lawson
*7 Although Lawson is not entitled to prevail for the reasons stated above, for the sake of completeness, we will briefly discuss Lawson's alternative contentions that (1) Lawson is the sole inventor, (2) Buell is the sole inventor and (3) Enloe derived the invention from Buell.
Lawson has established a date of conception as of March 8, 1985 based on his testimony and the corroborating testimony of Maxwell with respect to LX 15, pages 34 and 35 (LR 393-404, 517-519). Lawson's purported testing of a diaper meeting the terms of the count prior to his filing date (LR 15, pages 53-57) has not been corroborated by evidence independent of the inventor and thus Lawson's testimony regarding said testing is entitled to no weight. Reese v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 1222, 211 USPQ 936 (CCPA 1981). Lawson did not allege a date for the beginning of diligence in his preliminary statement. Accordingly, Lawson's date of invention is his October 11, 1985 filing date.
Lawson relies on LX 2, which consist of pages 101-104 of one of Buell's notebooks, and the testimony of Buell and William R. Vinnage to establish conception by Buell on March 8, 1979 and a reduction to practice on March 9, 1979. Page 101 describes a diaper which has two strips of one and one-half inch Kraton fabric attached by heat sealing to the top sheet through the crotch area inboard from the cuff. A 1/4 inch of material was left unsealed to act as a free flap for sealing. The free flap was toward the center of the crotch area. The embodiment on page 102 had the Kraton material under the top sheet and thus had no free flap. The embodiment on page 103 had a 1/2 inch Kraton strip on top of the right side of the top sheet with the inner side of the strip heat sealed to the top sheet. A 1/4 inch of material was left unsealed to form a free flap on the cuff side of the diaper. The left side of the diaper described on page 103 had two flaps one on top of the other with the top flap being 1/8 inch narrower than the bottom flap. Page 104 relates to tests done on the diaper described on page 103.
The left flap of the diaper on page 101 was cut every 3/8 inch and the flap on the right was "rolled up" or "rolled over" prior to placing the diaper on a mannequin for testing. The diaper was tested by loading it with a liquid, apparently simulating urine, starting with 75 milliliters (ml) and increasing in 25 ml increments. The left leg of the page 101 embodiment failed at 125 ml and right leg failed at 225 ml. Similar testing on a diaper of the type shown on page 102 resulted in failure at the left leg at 75 ml and at the right leg before 100 ml. As shown on page 104, the left leg of the page 103 embodiment failed at 75 ml and the right leg failed at 200 ml. The photographs on pages 101-104 were taken by and the descriptive material thereon was written by Vinnage on March 8 or 9, 1979 (LR 694-702). He does not remember if any diapers with Kraton on top of the topsheet were made after March 9, 1979. (LR 745-746). He could not recall what he meant by the phrase "rolled over edge" with respect the page 101 embodiment (LR 768-769). Also, he did not know if tests performed established that any of the diapers tested was satisfactory or unsatisfactory for its intended use (LR 769-774).
*8 Enloe contends (1) that the diapers illustrated and described on pages 101-104 of LX 2 do not show that Buell possessed conception of the invention of the count as of March 1979 because they do not include either the "elastically contractible gasketing cuff disposed adjacent to an edge of the absorbent article" or "spacing means associated with said barrier cuff for spacing said distal edge away from the top surface of said topsheet", (2) assuming conception has been established, the testing failed to establish a reduction to practice but was nothing more than an abandoned experiment and (3) assuming a reduction to practice has been established, Buell suppressed or concealed the invention.
In our view, Lawson has failed to establish that Buell conceived the invention at any time prior to Enloe's effective filing date. The construction of the diapers shown in the photographs on pages 101-104 of LX 2 is not clear from the photographs. The description of the constructions as testified to Buell is different from the constructions testified to by Vinnage. Buell testified that the Kraton material is a soft flexible material and that some element not visible in the photographs is attached to the topsheet in a prestretched condition and causes the topsheet to gather when the stretched element is allowed to relax (LR 163-164). Vinnage testified that the Kraton material is prestretched before being attached to the topsheet and the topsheet gathers when the Kraton material relaxes. Vinnage also says that the Kraton material was attached to the backsheet and topsheet in the outer cuff area in the page 101 embodiment (LR 743); whereas, the descriptive material on page 101 indicates that the Kraton material was only attached along a line inboard of the outer cuff leaving a 1/4 inch flap on the inboard side and a larger flap on the outboard side. The page 102 embodiment had no flaps and thus did not have any distal edge that could be spaced from the topsheet as required by the count. The page 103 embodiment only had an outboard flap. Thus, it is not clear that the outer cuff was elasticized in either the page 101 or 103 embodiment as called for in the count. Moreover, there was no spacing means for spacing the distal edge away from the top surface of the topsheet as also called for in the count. The Kraton material was merely gathered along with the topsheet and was not provided with any means to cause the distal edge of the flap to be spaced from the top surface of the topsheet. Accordingly, the embodiments relied upon by Lawson fail to show conception by Buell in March 1979. The testing was carried out on a crude mannequin fashioned by Vinnage out of "a piece of plexiglass that I took and made and folded to fit around the two cylinder tubes to simulate a leg." (LR 796). The diapers were not tested on live babies. The Development Record (LX 16) prepared by Lawson for his assignee's legal department in April 1985 sets forth advantages of the invention as:
*9 This diaper provides improved BM containment. Current diapers incorporate leg cuffs that ride down the leg, allowing runny BM to leak or exude at the leg cuffs when the child's weight is applied (sits/rolls over).
In our view, the testing performed by Vinnage in March 1979 on the LX 2 diaper embodiments was inadequate to show that the diapers tested would perform their intended function in actual use. The diapers were tested under static conditions on a crudely constructed mannequin; whereas, the intended use is under dynamic conditions on a baby who rolls over, sits up and otherwise moves his legs and torso around. Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1586, 3 USPQ2d 1793 (Fed.Cir.1987); Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 212 USPQ 721 (CCPA 1981); Micheletti v. Tapia v. Wignall, 196 USPQ 858 (Bd.Pat.Int. 858). Both Buell and Lawson testified that testing on live babies is required in order to show that a diaper will function properly in actual use (LR 261-266, 478-484).
No effort was made to patent or otherwise make public any of the embodiments shown on pages 101-104 of LX 2 from March 1979 to the present even though Buell filed at least two patent applications on diapers after March 1979 (LX 8 and 18). It was not until February of 1990, several months after this interference was initiated, that outside counsel for Lawson saw some faint resemblance between the diapers shown on pages 101-104 of LX 2 and the invention disclosed in the Lawson application (LR 548-549). Neither Buell nor Vinnage could recall working on diapers of the type shown in LX 2 after March 1979 (LR 241-242, 746). Buell does not recall whether he discussed any of the configurations on pages 101-104 of LX with his supervisor (LR 245). We consider the work done by Buell and Vinnage with respect to the LX 2 diaper embodiments to be nothing more than abandoned experiments. Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647 (CCPA 1976); Bowers v. Valley, 149 F.2d 284, 65 USPQ 493 (CCPA 1945); Wagner v. Notley, 202 USPQ 299 (Bd.Pat.Int.1977). However, to the extent that that work constituted an actual reduction to practice of the subject matter in issue, the unreasonable length of time between the March 1979 reduction to practice and the October 11, 1985 filing date of the Lawson patent application raises an inference of suppression or concealment which has not been rebutted with the result that Enloe would be entitled to prevail as the first inventor de jure. Peeler v. Miller, supra.
Lawson alleges another purported reduction to practice on February 18, 1982 by Buell with respect to the structure shown in the center figure on page 2 of LX 6. Vinnage said he made a diaper based on that drawing on February 18, 1982. In our view, that diaper does not constitute a conception or a reduction to practice of the invention in issue since it does not include a spacing means for spacing the distal edge of the barrier cuff away from the top surface of the topsheet and it was never tested under any conditions let alone under conditions which would show that it would perform its intended function in actual use.
*10 We now turn to Lawson's charge that Enloe derived the invention from Buell through Robert E. Kirby, who formerly worked for Lawson's assignee and began working for Enloe's assignee shortly after the effective filing date of the Enloe patent. In our view, there is no evidence in the record to support Lawson's charge of derivation. First of all, it has not been shown that Buell conceived the invention prior to Enloe's effective filing date. Thus, neither Buell, Kirby nor anyone else could have communicated the invention to Enloe prior to that date. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record, only speculation on the part of counsel, to support Lawson's contention that Kirby communicated any of Buell's work to Enloe or anyone else at Enloe's assignee prior to the effective filing date of the Enloe patent.
Motions to Suppress
Lawson has filed a motion (Paper No. 152) to suppress EX 14 on the ground that it was not introduced during Enloe's testimony period. The motion is denied since the exhibit was marked for identification and was identified by Kirby during cross-examination (LR 346-348). No objection to use of the exhibit was raised by Lawson at the deposition. The exhibit is deemed to be part of the record even though Enloe did not explicitly state on the record that the exhibit is "offered into evidence." Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 758 (Bd.Pat.Int.1973).
Enloe filed a motion (Paper No. 145) to suppress evidence submitted by Lawson relating to activities of Buell and Blevins which occurred prior to January 23, 1985, the earliest date alleged by Lawson in his original preliminary statement. The motion is denied since we have considered the evidence submitted for the sake of rendering a complete decision although we agree with Enloe that that evidence is not relevant to the question of when Lawson made the invention in issue.
Judgment as to the subject matter in the sole count in issue is hereby awarded to Kenneth M. Enloe, the senior party. Based on the record before us, Kenneth M. Enloe is entitled to a patent containing claims 68 through 104 corresponding to the count. Michael I. Lawson, the junior party, is not entitled to a patent containing claims 1, 2, 4 through 8, 10 through 12, 14 through 16, 19, 20, 22 through 24 and 26 corresponding to the count.
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES
James R. Boler
Irwin Charles Cohen
John C. Martin
FN1. The Lawson record and exhibits will be referred as "LR" and "LX", respectively, followed by the page or exhibit number. The Enloe exhibits will be referred to as "EX" followed by the exhibit number.
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