Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
*1 EX PARTE TOM T. KUMAGAI, WILLIAM C. LEONE, MICHAEL MAY, HAROLD L.
SHOEMAKER AND ROY A. HOWARD BY HOUDAILLE INDUSTRIES, INC.
Appeal No. 595-93
November 29, 1988
Hearing: October 13, 1988
Application filed January 8, 1979, Serial No. 001,542, for the Reissue of Patent No. 3,891,910, granted June 24, 1975 based on application Serial No. 181,168 filed September 16, 1971, which is a Continuation of Serial No. 598,525, filed January 12, 1966, which is a Division of Serial No. 827,981, filed March 10, 1959. Machine Tool Motor Control With Position Offset.
P. Phillips Conner et al. for appellant
Ormand R. Austin et al. for protestor, General Electric Company
Primary Examiner--David Smith, Jr.
Before Serota [FN1]
Chairman
Calvert
Vice-Chairman
Henon [FN1], Forrer and Craig
Examiners-in-Chief
Forrer
Examiner-in-Chief
This case is on appeal, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 134, from the final rejection of reissue application Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5. Claim 3, the only other pending claim, has been indicated by the examiner as being allowed. The General Electric Company is the protestor herein.
Claims 2 and 5 are here reproduced as being illustrative of the issue, with our emphasis added for reasons which be explained below:
2. In a numerically controlled machine tool system for controlling movement of a machine tool member with respect to a machine tool axis so as to relatively position a cutting tool and workpiece, said system comprising:
a. A preprogrammed input signal system operable during automatic operation for producing a sequence of preprogrammed machine tool instructions including preprogrammed groups of discrete coded electrical signals indicative of programmed positions of the machine tool member relative to said machine tool axis, and including a preprogrammed discrete correction signal representing polarity information needed to effect a correction in said machine tool instructions;
b. manually adjustable discrete signal device manually adjustable to supply a selected group of discrete coded correction signals representing cutting tool offset information needed to effect a correction in said machine tool instructions to compensate for cutting tool dimension;
c. a movement control system coupled to said input signal system and to said machine tool member and automatically operable during said automatic operation of said input signal system to effect the execution of the sequence of preprogrammed machine tool instructions; and
d. a signal processing system coupled with said input signal system and with said manually adjustable discrete signal device and with said movement control system, and automatically operable during automatic operation of said input signal system to respond to said preprogrammed groups of discrete coded electrical signals to control the operation of the movement control system in effecting the execution of said sequence of preprogrammed machine tool instructions, and responsive to said preprogrammed discrete correction signal to control the operation of the movement control system so as to offset the position of the machine tool member relative to said machine tool axis in accordance with said cutting tool offset information represented by the manually selected group of discrete coded correction signals and taking into account the polarity information represented by said preprogrammed discrete correction signal.
*2 5. In a numerically controlled machine tool system for controlling movement of a machine tool member with respect to a machine tool axis so as to relatively position a cutting tool and workpiece, said system comprising:
a. a preprogrammed input signal system operable during automatic operation for producing a sequence of preprogrammed machine tool instructions including preprogrammed groups of digital coded electrical signals indicative of programmed positions of the machine tool member relative to said machine tool axis, and including a preprogrammed digital correction signal representing polarity information needed to effect a correction in said machine tool instructions;
b. manually adjustable digital signal device manually adjustable to supply a selected group of digitally coded correction signals representing cutting tool offset information needed to effect a correction in said machine tool instructions to compensate for cutting tool dimension;
c. a movement control system coupled to said input signal system and to said machine tool member and automatically operable during said automatic operation of said input signal system to effect the execution of the sequence of preprogrammed machine tool instructions, and
d. a signal processing system coupled with said input signal system and with said manually adjustable digital signal device and with said movement control system, and automatically operable during automatic operation of said input signal system to respond to said preprogrammed groups of digitally coded electrical signals to control the operation of the movement control system in effecting the execution of said sequence of preprogrammed machine tool instructions, and responsive to said preprogrammed digital correction signal to control the operation of the movement control system so as to offset the position of the machine tool member relative to said machine tool axis in accordance with said cutting tool offset information represented by the manually selected group of digitally coded correction signals and taking into account the polarity information represented by said preprogrammed digital correction signal.
The following references are relied upon:
Parsons et al. (Parsons) 2,820,187 Jan. 14, 1958
Lippel 2,927,258 Mar. 1, 1960
Tripp 2,933,244 Apr. 19, 1960
Tripp 3,007,096 Oct. 31, 1961
Farmer, "Continuous Analogue Control", Aircraft Production, pp. 90 to 99, Mar. 1957.
Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102 as being unpatentable over Tripp '244, taken alone.
Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Parsons, Lippel and Tripp '244, taken together.
*3 Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 further stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Parsons, Lippel and Tripp '096, taken together.
Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 additionally stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Parsons, Lippel and Farmer, taken together.
The instant application purports to seek reissue of U.S. Patent No. 3,891,910 which issued June 24, 1975 upon application Serial No. 181,186. This '186 application was a continuation of application Serial No. 598,525, which itself matured into U.S. Patent No. 3,609,497, issued on September 28, 1971 with a seventeen year term expiration date of September 28, 1988, which date is pertinent here. During the prosecution of application Serial No. 181,186, in order to overcome a rejection based upon double patenting of the obvious type relative to claims of its parent case, U.S. Patent No. 3,609,497, a terminal disclaimer was filed therein (Paper No. 10 filed June 3, 1974). Thus, the term of U.S. Patent No. 3,891,910 also expired on September 28, 1988.
The instant case was filed on January 8, 1979 as a so-called "no defect" reissue application with its reissue declaration directed to the requirements of 37 C.F.R. 1.175 [FN2] as it then existed with the so-called Dann amendments to Subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) [FN3].
Upon filing, this reissue application contained only Claims 1, 2 and 3, which were verbatim with Claims 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of U.S. Patent No. 3,891,910, for which reissue is purportedly sought.
In the first office action (Paper No. 11 mailed January 26, 1982) the outstanding rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102 was entered and the reissue declaration was faulted for non-compliance with 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4), for reasons not pertinent here.
In an amendment in response thereto (Paper No. 12 filed April 23, 1982) a grammatical problem in Claim 3 was corrected and Claims 4 and 5 added, which are virtually verbatim with Claims 1 and 2, respectively, except that most instances of the word, "discrete", were replaced with either "digital" or "digitally". Compare the "emphasized" portions of Claims 2 and 5, provided above. No new reissue declaration was submitted.
In the second office action (Paper No. 16 mailed September 17, 1982) the outstanding rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 were added and the reissue declaration was again faulted for non-compliance with 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4).
A new reissue declaration (Paper No. 20 filed December 21, 1982) was submitted which, including its signature, is clearly an electrostatic copy. No reexecution or ratification has been effected.
In the final rejection (Paper No. 31 mailed September 20, 1983) it was ruled, without comment about the electrostatic signature copy, that the new reissue declaration satisfied the requirements of 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4) and that Claim 3 "satisfies" the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 and "meets" the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112. On the PTOL-326 summary sheet Claim 3 was indicated as "objected to" whereas in the examiner's answer Claim 3 was indicated as "allowed", without explanation. [FN4]
*4 From December 19, 1983 to June 18, 1984 the various appeal papers were entered. Then, from approximately June 18, 1984 until June 9, 1988 the case apparently was in the hands of the special program examiner for an inquiry under 37 C.F.R. 1.56 which resulted in a negative determination.
On July 21, 1988 the Clerk of the Board mailed the notice setting hearing for October 13, 1988.
On September 28, 1988 the statutory patent term expired for U.S. Patent No. 3,609,497 and the term of U.S. Patent No. 3,891,910, for which the previously mentioned terminal disclaimer was filed, also expired therewith.
On October 13, 1988 the hearing was held.
OPINION
It is our view that this case is no longer a "no defect" reissue application under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4); but, rather, it is now an "ordinary" or "regular" reissue application under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(3), such conversion having been effected by appellant's action, in Paper No. 12, submitting the amendment adding Claims 4 and 5. The Commissioner's Notice of November 13, 1978 [FN5] provides for the conversion effect of such amendments, as follows (original emphasis):
Applications filed under subsection (a)(4) will not, of course, be passed for issue without amendment, but will be rejected as lacking statutory basis for a reissue if there are no other grounds for rejection, since 35 U.S.C. 251 does not authorize reissue of a patent unless the patent is deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid. If a reissue filed under sub-section (a)(4) is subsequently amended thereby converting it into an application under sub-sections (a)(1) to (a)(3), a supplemental reissue oath or declaration must be filed containing the appropriate averments. If such a proper supplemental oath or declaration is not filed, a rejection will be made on the basis that the reissue oath or declaration is insufficient. The supplemental oath or declaration insures compliance with 35 U.S.C. 251 by providing appropriate averments relating to actual errors rather than possible errors.
A reiteration of this mandate as to the conversion effect of an amendment is found in the current M.P.E.P. 1414.02 (Rev. 3 May 1986) at page 1400-6, as follows:
If a reissue filed under § 1.175(a)(4) is amended, even though in response to a rejection, the reissue is thereby converted into an application under § 1.175(a)(1), and appropriate §§ 1.175(a)(2) and/or (a)(3), and a supplemental reissue oath or declaration must be filed containing the appropriate averments.
The supplemental reissue oath or declaration must comply with paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2)/(a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6), and (a)(7) if filed after July 1, 1982, of § 1.175, relating to actual errors rather than possible or "what might be deemed to be errors." If the claims are amended and a proper supplemental oath or declaration is not filed, a rejection must be made on the basis that the reissue oath or declaration is insufficient. The supplemental oath or declaration insures compliance with 35 U.S.C. 251 by providing appropriate averments relating to actual errors rather than possible errors.
*5 As this case is now an "ordinary" reissue application under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(3), it follows that we are here exercising appellate jurisdiction as the "statutory" board defined in 35 U.S.C. 134 rather than as the Commissioner's delegates forming an "advisory" panel for a "no-defect" reissue proceeding under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4). Compare In re Bose, 687 F.2d 432, 215 USPQ 1 (CCPA 1982); In re Dien, 680 F.2d 151, 214 USPQ 10 (CCPA 1982); Bally M'f'g Corp. v. Diamond, 629 F.2d 955, 207 USPQ 177 (4th Cir.1980); PIC Inc. v. Prescon Corp., 485 F.Supp. 1302, 205 USPQ 288 (D.Del.1980). Thus, once the amendments of Paper No. 12 were filed, appellant no longer should have been submitting, or the examiner seeking, a reissue declaration to comply with 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4); but, rather, the focus should have been upon a declaration complying with 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(3).
However, even if an adequate declaration under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(3) had been submitted and if there were no sustainable prior art rejections entered, appellant would now be unable to obtain a reissue patent based upon the instant reissue application because the term of U.S. Patent No. 3,891,910, for which reissue is sought, expired on September 28, 1988 due to appellant's terminal disclaimer, as mentioned previously. The applicable statute, 35 U.S.C. 251, only provides that the Commissioner is to,
... reissue the patent ... for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent.
There being no unexpired part of the term remaining, reissue can no longer be had and the question of the patentability of the instant claims under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103, in this application under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(3), is moot. Accordingly, under our authority as the "statutory" board provided for in 35 U.S.C. 134, we hereby dismiss the appeal as to Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5.
Neither appellant nor protestor has briefed the issues here decided, as we have raised them sua sponte. When these questions were broached from the bench at the hearing, appellant argued to the effect that Claims 4 and 5 are not subject to the terminal disclaimer. We do not consider any claims to be independent of the terminal disclaimer for its affects the term of the patent in its entirety and cannot be made with respect to only particular claims. See M.P.E.P. 1490 (Rev. 3, May 1986), first paragraph under the heading, "Terminal Disclaimer in Pending Applications Practice", which provides as follows:
*6 ... a terminal disclaimer directed to a particular claim or claims will not be accepted; the disclaimer must be of a terminal portion of the term of the entire patent to be granted.
Considering the fact that appellant's patent Claims 1 and 2 are identical to instant Claims 1 and 2 and are available for whatever purpose for which they may be effective relative to acts occurring during their term, coupled with the fact that appellant is now precluded from obtaining reissue as to claims 4 and 5 due to the terminal disclaimer, it appears that appellant is left in effectively, albeit not precisely, the same position which obtained at the time of filing under the "no defect" rule. That is, for all practical purposes, appellant is still asking for an unappealable, non-binding, "advisory" opinion on the subject matter of Claims 1 and 2 relative to 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 under conditions in which no reissue would be forthcoming. Accordingly, we consider it appropriate to now step aside from our "statutory" role as members of the appellate board of 35 U.S.C. 134 and instead act as the Commissioner's delegates [FN6] to effect the spirit and intent of the Dann amendment to 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4) by rendering the following "advisory" opinion.
ADVISORY OPINION
35 U.S.C. 102
The examiner considers Claims 1 and 2 to be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 102 over Tripp '244 which is an entirely analog system after the digital to analog conversion of the input data has been accomplished in stage D@1 of Fig. 4, the contents of which are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. It is the examiner's position that the claim language, particularly the "discrete" signal recitations, are readable on this analog portion of the system. The examiner has not faulted appellant's disclosure under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 relative to its support for the "discrete" signal recitations so, presumably, the examiner tacitly admits that these recitations are also readable upon appellant's digital system, despite the passing comment on answer page 20 which might be possibly construed to the contrary.
The only evidence the examiner has to support his position is the definition of "discrete" appearing in Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, G. & C. Merriam Co., Springfield, Ma., 1971, page 647, as follows:
dis . crete ...1a: possessed of definite identity or individuality: constituting a separate entity: DETACHED, SEPARATE ... 2: ... NONCONTINUOUS....
From this the examiner concludes that an analog signal can be discrete if it has an identity separate from that of every other signal in the system.
It is appellant's position that the word, "discrete", is limited to digital signals and so is not readable upon any analog signals in Tripp '244. In support thereof appellant relies upon Kumagai, Shoemaker and Leone as expert witnesses as to the meaning of the word, "discrete". Kumagai has provided the following statements: (at deposition page 40)
*7 Discrete electrical signal, and that is basically a binary signal, is my interpretation of a discrete signal.
(at deposition page 115)
If you could not read between two successive steps it would be discrete.
The Shoemaker statements relied upon are as follows: (at deposition page 27)
... a digital method has a series of discrete settings....
(at deposition page 57)
In a digital system they need to be discrete signals.
(at deposition page 114)
In the context of this paragraph, discrete does indeed mean digital.
Appellant also relies upon Leone for his general statement, at page 2 of his declaration, that appellant's position as to the meaning of "discrete" vis-a-vis "digital" is "accurate".
The protestor's witness, Kelling, does not address the question of the definition of "discrete".
To the extent that appellant is contending that this testimony of Kumagai, Shoemaker and Leone proves that the term, "discrete", is readable upon digital signals, their evidence is not material here because that point is not in controversy. As pointed out above, it is tacitly admitted by the examiner, whose effective position is that "discrete" is generic to analog and digital signals. Further, any such evidence, that "discrete" is readable upon digital signals, is not probative of the proposition that "discrete" is not readable upon analog signals. It simply does not address the question of other possible usages the term may have. Moreover, to the extent that appellant may be contending that these witnesses are by this testimony intending or implying that "discrete" is not readable upon analog signals, the witnesses are not competent to provide such testimony as to its analog meaning for they have not been qualified as expert witnesses in the analog machine tool control art. See Rule 702, F.R.E. [FN7], which provides that a witness testifying as to scientific knowledge is to be qualified as an expert. Kumagai frankly admits (deposition page 138), "I am not familiar with analog computers". Shoemaker, who holds a bachelor's degree in physics and math, only had one job in an "analog" field sometime between 1950 and 1954 (deposition page 9) but provides no details as to its precise nature, complexity or actual duration. Leone has a bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineering, a master's degree in mechanical engineering and a doctorate in an unspecified engineering field but he only asserts a "general familiarity" with machine tools and controls without regard to the analog field or any time frame (declaration page 1).
Accordingly, we find that appellant has not submitted any competent testimony to prove its contention that analog signals cannot be said to be discrete.
Appellant also relies upon the definition of "analog data" in Harrington, Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Robert E. Krieger Pub. Co., N.Y. 1979, page 294, which we reproduce in pertinent part (original emphasis):
*8 Analog data implies continuity.
****
The analog signal varies continuously from one end of its range to the other, in contrast to digital signals which must assume discrete values only.
Additionally, appellant relies upon the entry for "analog and digital data" in the IEEE Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic Terms, 1972, page 19, which we reproduce in pertinent part:
Analog data implies continuity as contrasted to digital data that is concerned with discrete states.
****
The information content of an analog signal is conveyed by the value or magnitude of some characteristics of the signal such as the amplitude, phase, or frequency....
****
The information content of the digital signal is concerned with discrete states of the signal, such as the presence or absence of a voltage....
Indiscriminate reliance should not be placed on layman's definitions found in dictionaries; rather, one should look to the pertinent technology. In re Salem, 533 F.2d 676, 193 USPQ 513, 518 (CCPA 1977). It appears from Harrington and the IEEE Dictionary, both authoritative publications, that in the technology the way to distinguish between analog and digital signals is to employ the term, "continuity", for the analog area and the terms, "discrete values" or "discrete states", for the digital area. The lay definition of "discrete" relied upon by the examiner does not even suggest its applicability to technical areas. Considering the present status of the claims, we conclude that the weight of the evidence is with the appellant and there is insufficient basis for reading the "discrete" signal recitations on the analog signals of Tripp '244. Accordingly, we do not find Claims 1 and 2 to be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 102 over Tripp '244.
35 U.S.C. 103
The examiner has approached the situation under § 103 assuming arguendo that the word, "discrete", in Claims 1 and 2 was to be given an interpretation limited to "digital" signals. Additionally, the examiner has approached the § 103 consideration of these claims not on what the examiner terms the "component level" but rather, as the examiner variously puts it, "at systems level" or "when viewed as systems" or with "system building blocks" or "for the purposes claimed." Under these qualifications the examiner has found that Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103 because the person of ordinary skill would have been led, by the Lippel teaching of the comparability of a analog machine tool control system and a digital machine tool control system, to implement the analog offset compensation teaching of Tripp '244, Tripp '096 or Farmer in digital form in the Parsons digital system.
In our view the examiner has not even established a prima facie case of obviousness, as he must. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871, 882 (CCPA 1981). The mistake in the examiner's case is that there is a lack of evidence to prove that, at the relevant time, a person of ordinary skill would have known how to make a digital offset correction circuit and particularly one providing polarity information. It does not follow, merely because of a knowledge of some digital circuits, as in Lippel and Parsons, that all possible digital circuits were thus necessarily within the ordinary skill. Furthermore, the examiner's "system building blocks" approach merely begs the question; an obvious system cannot be built with empty "blocks" devoid of any known circuit means. Compare In re Keller [FN8], supra, which concerned the same issue of "convertability " between analog and digital systems. Unlike here, in Keller, at 208 USPQ 878 right column, the examiner had provided evidence, the Walsh reference, to prove that the particular digital circuit means was already known in the art.
*9 Due to our opinion that a prima facie case of obviousness has not been established, we need not reach the testimony of the respective witnesses of appellant and protestor directed to the question whether such a case of obviousness has been overcome.
Summary
The statutory appeal, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 134, is dismissed as to Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5.
An advisory opinion is provided to the effect that the examiner's holdings that Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 are unsupported by evidence.
37 CFR 1.136(a) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE TIMES FOR TAKING ANY SUBSEQUENT ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL.
DISMISSED
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES
Chairman
Ian A. Calvert
Vice-Chairman
Paul J. Henon, Jr.
Examiner-in-Chief
Donald D. Forrer
Examiner-in-Chief
Jerry D. Craig
Examiner-in-Chief
FN1. Serota and Henon were added post hearing to form the present expanded panel.
FN2. § 1.175 Reissue oath or declaration.
(a) Applicants for reissue, in addition to complying with the requirements of the first sentence of § 1.65, must also file with their applications a statement under oath or declaration as follows:
(1) When the applicant verily believes the original patent to be wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, stating such belief and the reasons why.
(2) When it is claimed that such patent is so inoperative or invalid "by reason of a defective specification or drawing," particularly specifying such defects.
(3) When it is claimed that such patent is inoperative or invalid "by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent," distinctly specifying the excess or insufficiency in the claims.
(4) When the applicant is aware of prior art to other information relevant to patentability, not previously considered by the Office, which might cause the examiner to deem the original patent wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, particularly specifying such prior art or other information and requesting that if the examiner so deems, the applicant be permitted to amend the patent and be granted in a reissue patent.
(5) Particularly specifying the errors or what might be deemed to be errors relied upon, and how they arose or occurred.
(6) Stating that said errors, if any, arose "without any deceptive intention" on the part of the applicant.
(b) Corroborating affidavits or declarations of others may be filed and the examiner may, in any case, require additional information or affidavits or declarations concerning the application for reissue and its object.
FN3. The Dann amendments were effective March 1, 1977; Commissioner's Notice of January 18, 1977, 955 O.G. 1054, reprinted 1086 T.M.O.G. 175 (January 5, 1988). They were cancelled July 1, 1982; Commissioner's Notice of April 6, 1982, 1019 O.G. 37, reprinted 1086 T.M.O.G. 212 (January 5, 1988). However, they were to remain in effect for reissue applications filed during their effective dates; Commissioner's Notice of November 16, 1981, 1013 O.G. 18, reprinted 1086 T.M.O.G. 217 (January 5, 1988).
FN4. It is not entirely clear what the examiner envisioned by the categories, "objected to" and "allowed", since he continually treated this case as being pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4) and M.P.E.P. 1414.02 provides that such a reissue application cannot be passed to issue.
FN5. 977 O.G. 1 (December 12, 1978), reprinted 1086 T.M.O.G. 183 (January 5, 1988).
FN6. It is not unusual for PTO board members to wear two hats. Before the "Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984," P.L. 98-622, 1050 O.G. 320, the Examiners of Interferences regularly served on the "statutory" Board of Patent Interferences defined by the former 35 U.S.C. 135(a) and also served as the Commissioner's non-statutory delegates to provide "recommendations" pursuant to former 37 C.F.R. 1.259. A similar situation obtains in interferences since the 1984 Act with the Examiners-in-Chief both serving on the "statutory" board provided for in present 35 U.S.C. 135(a) and also acting as non-statutory delegates of the Commissioner to provide "recommendations" under 37 C.F.R. 1.659.
FN7. Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FN8. Keller was also, as here, a case concerning a "no defect" protested reissue application under 37 C.F.R. 1.175(a)(4). However, no question of conversion from an "(a)(4)" to an "(a)(3)" case in accordance with the Commissioner's notice due to the presentation of amendments was there raised.
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