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WILLIAM H. FRANKEL DONALD W. RUPERT R. LEWIS GABLE*

JAMES P. NAUGHTON WILLIAM P. OBERHARDT

ROBERT W. FIESELER HUGH A. ABRAMS RAYMOND N. NIMROD RICHARD A. CEDEROTH

DEBORAH SCHAVEY RUFF

PHILIP T. PETTI STEVEN R. TRYBUS

NEUMAN, WILLIAMS, ANDERSON & OLSON

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS

77 WEST WASHINGTON STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602-2954

312-346-1200 DIRECT DIAL SYSTEM 312-346-0850 CABLE JONAD CHICAGO TELEX 190462 FACSIMILE 312-346-5419

WASHINGTON OFFICE CRYSTAL PLAZA ONE-SUITE 903 2001 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-3603 703-892-6/87 FACSIMILE 703-892-8792

ALLENTOWN, PA OFFICE 1929 BROOKHAVEN DRIVE EAST ALLENTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA 18103 215-434-7915

THEODORE W. ANDERSON ARTHUR A. OLSON, JR. DONALD A. PETERSON WILLIAM J. BIRMINGHAM JOSEPH P. CALABRESE GREGORY B. BEGGS GREGORT B. BEGGS NOEL I. SMITH JOHN J. CAVANAUGH HARRY J. ROPER MICHAEL O. WARNECKE JAMES T. WILLIAMS WILLIAM M. WESLEY J. BRADFORD LEAHEEY GEORGE S. BOSY HERBERT D. HART III NICHOLAS A. POULOS

ADMITTED IN D.C. AND VIRGINIA AND RESIDENT IN WASHINGTON OFFICE "ADMITTED IN PENNSYLVANIA AND RESIDENT IN ALLENTOWN OFFICE

October 3, 1989

RICHARD P. BEEM THOMAS S. BORECKI STEVEN P. PETERSEN JOHN M. AUGUSTYN STEPHEN G. MICAN WESLEY O. MUELLER DANIEL J. KRIEGER GEORGE WHEELER

SIDNEY NEUMAN FRED T. WILLIAMS COUNSEL

VAN METRE LUND E. EUGENE INNIS**

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Thomas A. Briody, Esq. North American Philips Corp. 580 White Plains Road Tarrytown, New York 10591

> Magnavox v. Activision Re: Our File 53137

Dear Tom:

Attached is a copy of the Joint Pretrial Statement which was filed on Monday, October 2, 1989. We would appreciate any comments that you might have.

Sincerely,

NEUMAN, WILLIAMS, ANDERSON & OLSON

By_ Richard A. Cederoth

RAC/rtj Enclosure

Norman J. Marsh, Jr., Esq. CC: Theodore W. Anderson, Esq. James T. Williams, Esq.



1 THEODORE W. ANDERSON JAMES T. WILLIAMS 2 RICHARD A. CEDEROTH NEUMAN, WILLIAMS, ANDERSON & OLSON 3 77 West Washington Street Chicago, IL 60602-2954 4 J. THOMAS ROSCH 5 ROBERT L. EBE MCCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN & ENERSEN 6 Three Embarcadero Center San Francisco, CA 94111 7 Telephone: (415) 393-2000 8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs THE MAGNAVOX COMPANY and SANDERS ASSOCIATES, INC. 9 10 MARTIN R. GLICK H. JOSEPH ESCHER III 11 M. PATRICIA THAYER HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROVSKI, CANADY, 12 ROBERTSON & FALK A Professional Corporation 13 Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 14 Telephone: (415) 434-1600 15 Attorneys for Defendant MEDIAGENIC (formerly Activision, Inc.) 16 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 18 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 19) No. C 82 5270 CAL THE MAGNAVOX COMPANY, a corporation, and SANDERS 20 JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., a REGARDING DAMAGES corporation, 21 Plaintiffs, Pretrial Conference 22 Date: October 12, 1989 Time: 3:30 p.m. VS. 23 ACTIVISION, INC., a 24 corporation, 25 Defendant. 26 27 28 JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT RE DAMAGES -1-

C. <u>Substance of the Action</u>.

This is the damages phase of an action for patent infringement with respect to certain claims of a single patent, U.S. Patent Re. 28,507 (hereinafter "the '507 patent" or "the Rusch patent"). In December 1985, this Court ruled that Activision had infringed and contributorily infringed the '507 patent owned by Sanders and licensed to Magnavox. The Court also ruled that the infringement was not willful and was in good faith, and denied an injunction. Judgment was entered on March 13, 1986.

Activision appealed the rulings on infringement and validity to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §1292(c)(2) and Magnavox cross-appealed on the issues of no willful infringement and denial of the preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit affirmed this Court's rulings on the liability phase of the trial in their entirety, and the case was remanded. On August 8, 1988, this Court entered a permanent injunction against infringement of the '507 patent. The permanent injunction and the patent term expired on April 25, 1989.

The sole remaining issue remaining to be tried in this
case is the amount of damages from Activision's past infringement.

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D. Undisputed Facts.

1. The present action was filed on September 28, 1982.
All issues except for damages were tried to this Court, sitting
without a jury, during the summer of 1985. The Court entered 140
findings of fact on December 27, 1985. Those findings are
incorporated herein by reference.

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2. In 1986 Sanders became a wholly owned subsidiary of

F. <u>Relief Prayed</u>.

Plaintiffs seek 10% of total sales per accounting period
 or a minimum of \$1.00 per infringing cartridge, plus interest at the
 Chase Manhattan Prime rate from date of infringement.

Defendant contends that the reasonable royalty rate should be 1% or less, depending on the extent of use of the patented feature in a cartridge, and that the interest rate should be no more than the coupon issue yield equivalent of the average auction price for 52-week Treasury bills.

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JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT RE DAMAGES

the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. <u>Story</u> <u>Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.</u>, 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).

5 4. The infringer "is not entitled to complain that they 6 cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would 7 be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for 8 making, were otherwise." <u>Story Parchment</u>, 282 U.S. at 563.

9 5. Any doubts or uncertainties regarding the amount of the
 10 damages must be resolved against the wrongdoer, <u>Activision</u>.
 11 Lam, 718 F.2d at 1065.

12 6. The issue now is the amount of damages adequate to
13 compensate Magnavox for Activision's infringement. 35 U.S.C.
14 Sec. 284; <u>State Industries v. Mor-Flo Industries</u>, No. 89-1032,
15 Slip Opinion at 7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 1989). That amount is not
16 to be less than a reasonable royalty, together with interest and
17 costs as fixed by the court. Id.

7. The calculation of a reasonable royalty is not designed
to be a simple accounting procedure but, rather, sets a floor
below which a damage award cannot descend. <u>Del Mar Avionics</u>,
<u>Inc. v. Quinton Instruments Co.</u>, 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
1988).

8. To meet the compensatory mandate of the statute that an award of damages be adequate to compensate for the infringement, the court may award damages greater than a ///

13. The determination of a reasonable royalty is based on 1 the royalty to which a hypothetical willing licensor and a 2 hypothetical willing licensee would have agreed at the time the 3 infringement began, if both had been reasonably and voluntarily 4 trying to reach an agreement at arm's length. It is the 5 hypothetical amount which a prudent licensee - who desired, as a 6 business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and 7 sell a particular article using the patented invention - would 8 9 have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable to 10 a prudent licensor who was willing to grant a license. TWM 11 Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898-900 (Fed. 12 Cir. 1986); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 788 13 F.2d 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Deere & Co. v. International 14 Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Panduit 15 Corp. v. Stahlin Bros., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978). 16 14. Facts relevant to any of the following factors 17 generally may be considered in determining a reasonable royalty. 18 (i) The commercial relationship between Magnavox and 19 Activision, such as, the fact that they were competitors in 20 the same territories with related products at the time the 21 infringement began; 22 (ii) The existing value of the invention to Magnavox or

Activision as a generator of sales of its non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales; ///

17. The patent owner and exclusive licensee are entitled 1 to recover compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered from the 2 infringement, without regard to the question whether the 3 infringer has gained or lost by the unlawful acts. Coupe v. 4 Roger, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895). There is no rule that the 5 infringer's net profit limits the reasonable royalty award. 6 State Industries, Slip Op. at 17; Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 7 1557. 8

9 18. A willing licensor would normally consider any profits 10 which it expected to lose by licensing a competitor. Such 11 anticipated lost profits could result from (i) lost sales of the 12 patented products; (ii) lost sales of collateral products; and 13 (iii) lost profits caused by the infringer's competition. <u>TWM</u> 14 <u>Mfg.</u>, 789 F.2d at 899-900.

19. A royalty rate or lump sum may be based on an 15 infringer's expected sales and profits, even if those 16 expectations exceed the actual sales or profits of the 17 infringer. A reasonable royalty is not based on an infringer's 18 actual profits, especially when the infringer anticipates 19 profits and sales of other items in conjunction with the sale of 20 the infringing product. Snellman v. Ricoh Co., Ltd., 862 F.2d 21 283, 289-290 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 1557. 22 20. A reasonable royalty need not leave an infringer with 23 any actual net profit. State Industries, Slip Op. at 16-17; 24 Hanson v. Alpine Valley, 718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 25 Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1164; Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 1557. 26

That would constitute afiction that the infringement never happened and that the patentee had not been forced into the time and expense of litigation. This factor may increase the amount of a reasonable royalty. <u>Panduit</u>, 575 F.2d at 1156-59; <u>Stickle v. Hublein</u>, 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

6 26. The award of prejudgment interest is the norm in 7 patent cases; no exceptional circumstances are required to 8 support such an award. <u>General Motors v. Devex</u>, 461 U.S. 648, 9 657 (1983); <u>Bio-Rad Labs. v. Nicolet Instrument Co.</u>, 807 F.2d 10 964, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

11 27. The normal procedure is to award prejudgment interest 12 from the date of first infringement to the date of payment. 13 <u>Bio-Rad</u>, 807 F.2d at 967. Only such an award will satisfy 14 Congress' overriding purpose of affording patent owners complete 15 compensation. Id. (quoting <u>General Motors v. Devex</u>, 461 U.S. at 16 655).

Prejudgment interest may only be denied when the 28. 17 infringer proves exceptional circumstances that justify 18 withholding prejudgment interest. Nickson, 847 F.2d at 800-01. 19 29. The rate and method of compounding of the prejudgment 20 interest to be awarded is within the discretion of the Court. 21 Bio-Rad, 807 F.2d at 969; Gyromat v. Champion Spark Plug, 735 22 F.2d 549,557 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The exercise of that discretion, 23 however, must be guided by the purpose of prejudgment interest, 24

which is to ensure that the patent owner is placed in as good a position as he would have been had the infringer entered into a

district court can constitute evidence of willful infringement.
 <u>Bott v. Four Star Corp.</u>, 807 F.2d 1567, 1572-74 (Fed. Cir.
 1988). The same is even more true for continuing to market and
 sell the infringing products after the district court's decision
 has been affirmed. <u>Id</u>.

6 34. When willful infringement for any period is found, the 7 trial court has discretion to award up to three times the 8 damages assessed for that period. 35 U.S.C. Sec. 284; <u>Ryco</u>, 857 9 F.2d at 1429; <u>Bott</u>, 807 F.2d at 1574.

35. Willful infringement may also be a sufficient basis for finding a case to be exceptional for purposes of awarding attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 285. <u>Ryco</u>, 857 F.2d at 1429. If a case is found to be exceptional, the Court may exercise its discretion to award attorney fees. <u>Id</u>.

36. Contempt occurs when the infringer sells products
 within the adjudicated scope of the patent claims. <u>Amstar Corp.</u>
 <u>v. Envirotech Corp.</u>, 823 F.2d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

37. Willful infringement after a district court's entry of
 an injunction constitutes contempt of the district court. <u>Paper</u>
 <u>Converting Machine v. Magna-Graphics Corp.</u>, 745 F.2d 11, 20
 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

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Patent Office, without fear of a ruinous penalty for asserting a position taken in good faith.'"); <u>Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minnesota</u> <u>Mining & Manufacturing Co.</u>, 647 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir.), <u>cert</u>. <u>denied</u>, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981) ("As in so much of patent law, we observe here the tension between the law's desire to protect the patentee and its desire to preserve competition."); <u>Union Carbide</u> <u>Corp. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.</u>, 282 F.2d 653, 675 (7th Cir. 1960), <u>cert. denied</u>, 365 U.S. 812 (1961).

5. Damages may be measured in one of three ways:
(a) the patentee's lost profits (plaintiffs do not seek lost profits
in this case); (b) the established royalty in the industry for a
license to use the patented invention; or (c) a reasonable royalty
based on the value of the invention. <u>Fromson v. Western Litho Plate</u>
and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574-76 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

15 In general, the reasonable royalty is "the amount 6. 16 which a prudent licensee--who desired, as a business proposition, to 17 obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article 18 embodying the patented invention--would have been willing to pay as 19 a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which 20 amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was 21 willing to grant a license." Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States 22 Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 23 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). See 24 Wallace Business Forms, Inc. v. Uarco Inc., No. 80 C 3397 (N.D. Ill. 25 Sept. 30, 1988) (LEXIS 11191), aff'd in relevant part, _____ F.2d ____ 26 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 19, 1989).

Additional factors which a court may consider in
 calculating a reasonable royalty include:

particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.

13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.

14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts."

⁸ Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., supra, 318 F.
⁹ Supp. at 1120.

10 8. The royalty rate a patentee offers the industry after
11 a court has held its patent valid is highly probative of a
12 reasonable royalty. <u>Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp.</u>, 494 F.
13 Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1980), <u>aff'd</u>, 667 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1981),
14 <u>aff'd</u>, 461 U.S. 648 (1983); <u>Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Dart</u>
15 <u>Industries</u>, 666 F. Supp. 674, 680 n.6 (D. Del. 1987), <u>aff'd</u>, 862
16 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988); <u>see also Calhoun v. United States</u>, 453
17 F.2d 1385, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1972).

9. An offer to license made by the plaintiff to the
defendant after infringement may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable royalty. <u>See Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v.</u>
A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir.), <u>cert. denied</u>, 469 U.S. 871
(1984).

10. "[T]he true measure of a patentee's general damages
must be the value of what was taken." <u>Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire</u>
<u>Co.</u>, 704 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <u>Marvel Specialty Co. v.</u>
<u>Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc.</u>, 386 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1967), <u>cert</u>.
<u>denied</u>, 390 U.S. 1030 (1968).

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11. "A patentee, of course, is only entitled to recover

1 delay in payment of the damages, and not to punish the infringer.
2 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
3 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

The district court has substantial discretion to
determine the rate of prejudgment interest in patent infringement
cases. <u>General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.</u>, 461 U.S. 648, 657
(1983); <u>Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.</u>, 735 F.2d 549, 556
(Fed. Cir. 1984); <u>Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. Stucki Co.</u>, 727 F.2d
1506, 1515 (Fed. Cir.), <u>cert. denied</u>, 469 U.S. 871 (1984).

10 18. Plaintiffs' assertion of contempt is untimely, given 11 the facts that (a) defendant notified plaintiffs of its inadvertent 12 violation of the Court's injunction in January 1989 and promised at 13 that time to cease foreign sales, (b) plaintiffs have taken no steps 14 during the intervening ten months to institute contempt proceedings, 15 and (c) the term of the patent and the injunction expired on 16 April 25, 1989. See American Foundry & Manufacturing Co. v. Josam 17 Manufacturing Co., 79 F.2d 116, 124 (8th Cir. 1935).

18 19. Plaintiffs have not followed the correct procedures 19 for instituting contempt proceedings. Plaintiffs had the burden of 20 lodging a motion for contempt, giving adequate notice to defendant 21 of the nature of contempt and the grounds therefor, when they 22 learned of the inadvertent infringing sales in January 1989. See 11 23 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §2960 at 588-89 24 (1973).

25 21. It would be inappropriate to address plaintiffs'
26 newly asserted contempt allegations during trial of damages. The
27 law of contempt, including plaintiffs' heavy burden of proof by
28 clear and convincing evidence and the available remedies, is

JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT RE DAMAGES -23-

l	Defendant's Witnesses
2	Defendant expects to call during its case in chief:
3	Algy Tamoshunas
. 4	Robert Mayer Thomas Briody
5	Bruce Davis James Levy
All excelption of	Jamie Cook
6	Ronald Goldman Brian Dougherty
7	Alan Silverman Gail Conely
. 8	Smith McKeithen.
9	The parties reserve the right to call rebuttal or other witnesses as
10	necessary and appropriate.
11	It multiplet party has regeared mandaunts of placings or di
12	J. <u>Exhibits, Schedules and Summaries</u> .
13	The parties will submit separate statements of Exhibits,
14	Schedules and Summaries. Such statements will be served and filed
15	by October 10, 1989. The parties expect that they will be able to
16	reach agreement regarding authenticity of documents. The list of
17	witnesses above, Section I, assumes that the parties will be
18	successful in agreeing on the authenticity of documents.
19	1" court's judgments by the federal circuit surther discussion
20	K. Further Discovery or Motions.
21	Other than the completion of several expert and percipient
	witness depositions, there is no further discovery to be done, nor
	are there any motions pending. However, there is a dispute
	concerning witness testimony which will be brought up at the
25	pretrial conference.
26	- Instructure State State State State
27	27. 27. The parties do not wish in prevent the action of
28	25 an equad statement of facts, although affords vill be and
	JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT RE DAMAGES -25-

1 stipulate to as many facts as reasonably possible and productive.
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P. Bifurcation, Separate Trial of Issues.

This action has previously been bifurcated on the issues of liability and damages. The damages phase of the action is now before the Court. Plaintiffs see no need for further bifurcation as 7 to any remaining issues.

⁸ Defendant contends that trial on the issue of willful
⁹ infringement with respect to sales occurring after entry of the
¹⁰ Court's findings of fact, and any motion for contempt, should
¹¹ proceed after the parties' presentation on the issue of damages.
¹² Plaintiffs contend that these issues are part of the damages
¹³ determination.

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Q. Consent To Trial Before A Magistrate.

In view of Judge Legge's conduct of this trial on In view of Judge Legge's conduct of this trial on liability and consideration of the evidence and witnesses presented at that trial, the parties do not believe that reference of all or part of this action or proceeding to a master or magistrate would be feasible and do not agree to such.

21

22

R. Appointment and Limitation of Experts.

The appointment of an impartial expert witness by the Court is neither feasible nor desirable. The parties have each engaged experts to testify at trial. No limit on the number of experts is necessary as each party has engaged a reasonable number of experts (four for Activision and two for Magnavox), given the complexity of the damages analysis.

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2	
3	V. <u>Miscellanous</u>
4	None.
5	Dated: October 2 , 1989.
6	THEODORE W. ANDERSON
7	JAMES. T. WILLIAMS RICHARD A. CEDEROTH
8	NEUMAN, WILLIAMS, ANDERSON & OLSON
9	By Shevdowh Cemen
10	Theodore W. Anderson
11	Attorneys for Plaintiffs THE MAGNAVOX COMPANY and SANDERS ASSOCIATES, INC.
12	bhe sume day as the day of collection is the ordinary course
13	MARTIN R. GLICK H. JOSEPH ESCHER III
14	M. PATRICIA THAYER HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROVSKI, CANADY
15	ROBERTSON & FALK A Professional Corporation
16	Illet & sil
17	ByMartin R. Glick
18	Attorneys for Defendant MEDIAGENIC
19	(formerly Activision, Inc.
20	[19] Remarchance Courtain, 7th Flash, San Princisco, Califording, 19
21	core lief as beautiful the very strange
22	Thenders W. Wederson
23	Ridiard A. Ceterath
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	JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT RE DAMAGES -29-

J. Thomas Rosch 1 Robert L. Ebe McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen 2 Three Embarcadero Center San Francisco, CA 94111 3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is 4 true and correct. Executed at San Francisco, California on 5 October 2, 1989. 6 7 Admalita E. Donnalita E. 8 Jones 9 10 11 HOWARD RICE 12 NEMEROVSKI CANADY 13 ROBERTSON & FALK 14 A Professional Corporation 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 -2-